All Lane Running - Smart Motorways ?

[Chris5156]

For a near miss event to be officially record then it will have been judged a event with the potential to injury or kill. All the above organisations have a 'zero tolerance' approach and would be extremely alarmed at such a large jump in reported incidents - not to seek ways of dismissing them. Please remember that this information has not come from a BBC reporter making things up - its come from a FOI request into Highways England own records.

Dismissing the numbers is a bit like going round and saying it no problem crime statistics are going up because people are reporting it more. Yes the grater reporting may be good in itself - but what that means is efforts need to be redoubled to tackle it - not prevaricate or dismiss the statistics as not being meaningful as you are trying to do.

Having already called me a fool you're now putting words in my mouth. I'm not dismissing the statistics, I'm trying to understand them, and I have yet to hear anything from you that answers my concern - which is that we simply do not know in what circumstances "near misses" were recorded before the Smart Motorway upgrade work and after it. You yourself do not know that - you're working from a series of assumptions about what happens in the HE control room based on guesswork.

Had things like layby provision been maintained at 600m and radar detection been employed to detect stationary vehicles from the outset then I am sure the number of misses recorded in the post ALR setup would be significantly less.

You keep mentioning "radar detection" as though it could have been installed and some pennypinching manager just decided not to install it. Unfortunately no such technology exists, at least not in a workable state ready to roll out to hundreds of miles of motorway. Yes, radar detection exists on level crossings and is a proven technology, but Highways England have been experimenting with stopped vehicle detection for several years and - as far as I'm able to ascertain - haven't yet found anything that actually works to a level of reliability and with few enough false positives to make it workable and to provide blanket coverage on a live motorway.

Saying the railways do this and the railways do that is fine, but you're not dealing with the railways. On the trunk road network the approach to risk management is very different, the culture of incident reporting is very different, the variables are greater and the problems in detecting stationary vehicles are much more complex.

[ManomayLR]

It is worth noting that the M25 section in question is fitted with stopped vehicle detection. Albeit recently, but it has.

[Debaser]

Since one example of a 'near miss' is "Failed or unplanned use of ATM signalling used for the protection of construction / maintenance operatives" and one of the main complaints of many on here is how the lane signalling is either not working or incorrectly set, it isn't inconceivable that this is the bulk of 'near-misses' - which paints rather a different picture to what many seem to think is describing a user/user conflict.

[Chris5156]

With apologies for the double post - can anyone find the actual FOI request and the response from HE? I understood that all FOI responses are published as a matter of course on gov.uk and whatdotheyknow.com, but I've searched both and can't find any request or response that contains any such figure. Perhaps I'm wrong and not all are posted online. We'd know it if we found it - it would also include data on failed electronic signage, which the report also quotes.

As the article doesn't state which length of M25 is in question, it's tricky to find corresponding data any other way, but it's presumably either J5-7 or J23-27 which are the ALR sections. Collision data for both is available online (5-7, 23-27 PDFs), which show a mixed bag of results - total collisions weren't wildly different before and after on either stretch; total KSI went up on one scheme and down on the other.

[Phil]

For a near miss event to be officially record then it will have been judged a event with the potential to injury or kill. All the above organisations have a 'zero tolerance' approach and would be extremely alarmed at such a large jump in reported incidents - not to seek ways of dismissing them. Please remember that this information has not come from a BBC reporter making things up - its come from a FOI request into Highways England own records.

Dismissing the numbers is a bit like going round and saying it no problem crime statistics are going up because people are reporting it more. Yes the grater reporting may be good in itself - but what that means is efforts need to be redoubled to tackle it - not prevaricate or dismiss the statistics as not being meaningful as you are trying to do.

Having already called me a fool you're now putting words in my mouth. I'm not dismissing the statistics, I'm trying to understand them, and I have yet to hear anything from you that answers my concern - which is that we simply do not know in what circumstances "near misses" were recorded before the Smart Motorway upgrade work and after it. You yourself do not know that - you're working from a series of assumptions about what happens in the HE control room based on guesswork.

Had things like layby provision been maintained at 600m and radar detection been employed to detect stationary vehicles from the outset then I am sure the number of misses recorded in the post ALR setup would be significantly less.

You keep mentioning "radar detection" as though it could have been installed and some pennypinching manager just decided not to install it. Unfortunately no such technology exists, at least not in a workable state ready to roll out to hundreds of miles of motorway. Yes, radar detection exists on level crossings and is a proven technology, but Highways England have been experimenting with stopped vehicle detection for several years and - as far as I'm able to ascertain - haven't yet found anything that actually works to a level of reliability and with few enough false positives to make it workable and to provide blanket coverage on a live motorway.

Saying the railways do this and the railways do that is fine, but you're not dealing with the railways. On the trunk road network the approach to risk management is very different, the culture of incident reporting is very different, the variables are greater and the problems in detecting stationary vehicles are much more complex.

Do feel free to write me another condescending reply, though.

If stopped vehicle detection is still at the experimental stage then I am quite happy to withdraw my remarks about it not being employed by HE as a matter of course. It does however offer significant benefits in eliminating human error and for that reason alone its worth pushing its development.

That said, if its not available then the control centres need to be staffed such that camera operators can monitor cameras effectively without distractions and mitigate the increased risks of ALR.

The fact that it takes on average 17 minutes to do that at present says there are not nearly enough people employed - which comes back to penny pinching AND not carrying out a proper risk assessment as if done properly that would clearly have identified the need for extra personnel.

As for trying to make out the road network is somehow massively different when it comes to risk assessment - thats an attitude that needs to be corrected ASAP. While there are obviously significant differences in terms of what is possible between what might be the more 'controlled' transport networks (be the rail, air or sea) situations and roads, good risk management that seeks to actively reduce near misses of all types and not accept the status quo (or dismiss rapid rises in statistics as somehow not worth bothering to investigate) is just as relevant. Accepting a certain level of near misses / incidents may be unavoidable - but that does not oblivate HE or the designers of highway projects from looking to reduce that figure with each and every scheme they are involved in. Now of course it is likely you and your colleagues do this as a matter of course - but when it comes to ALR we wouldn't be getting the current levels of worry if that were the case across the board.

As for sending condensing messages - I would have thought that ANY responsible highways engineer would have shown concern about the figures the BBC unearthed and wished to examine them in more detail. If after through examination it turns out they are not as bad as first appears then no harm has been done and the critics of SMART motorways are shown to be wrong. The keenness with which you seek to rubbish the figures is thus very disturbing.

[Phil]

From this it seems that these recorded near misses are more to do with maintenance/construction personnel being nearly hit by passing road users, rather than road user/road user conflict. Which makes sense given the reporting structure in place.

Of course just because the near miss involves maintenance / construction personnel doesn't mean they are any less serious or acceptable than straight forward road user on road user incidents.

[Phil]

Since one example of a 'near miss' is "Failed or unplanned use of ATM signalling used for the protection of construction / maintenance operatives" and one of the main complaints of many on here is how the lane signalling is either not working or incorrectly set, it isn't inconceivable that this is the bulk of 'near-misses' - which paints rather a different picture to what many seem to think is describing a user/user conflict.

It could well be as you say - although in some ways does it really matter whether the near miss is with a maintenance crew or another road user.

Obviously the former should be easier to mitigate in the sense that improved communication between maintenance crews and the control room would ensure signage protection was in place as the crew arrived on site.

Near misses should be avoided full stop and if there are things HE can do better to prevent them we need to know they are taking action and not siting back accepting the status quo. It will be interesting to see the specifics of behind the BBCs worrying figures.

[Chris5156]

If stopped vehicle detection is still at the experimental stage then I am quite happy to withdraw my remarks about it not being employed by HE as a matter of course. It does however offer significant benefits in eliminating human error and for that reason alone its worth pushing its development.

My understanding is that it's still at the trial stage, which is why it's been installed on two lengths of the M25 and nowhere else yet. But I've no inside knowledge from Highways England so I don't know what stage they're at - only that it's not yet working as they want it to. If it was, they'd have a very quick fix to this PR storm by announcing that they've figured out how to detect stopped vehicles and they'll be doing it nationwide within X months at a cost of Y pounds. They haven't done that, I suspect because they can't.

The fact that it takes on average 17 minutes to do that at present says there are not nearly enough people employed - which comes back to penny pinching AND not carrying out a proper risk assessment as if done properly that would clearly have identified the need for extra personnel.

I absolutely agree that 17 minutes isn't an acceptable timeframe for spotting a stranded vehicle and doing something about it, especially when you'd expect - ahead of anyone in the control room happening to spot it - someone in that vehicle would often make contact with the emergency services fairly quickly after stopping. The fact that 17 minutes is the current quoted figure is not acceptable.

Now of course it is likely you and your colleagues do this as a matter of course - but when it comes to ALR we wouldn't be getting the current levels of worry if that were the case across the board.

As for sending condensing messages - I would have thought that ANY responsible highways engineer would have shown concern about the figures the BBC unearthed and wished to examine them in more detail. If after through examination it turns out they are not as bad as first appears then no harm has been done and the critics of SMART motorways are shown to be wrong. The keenness with which you seek to rubbish the figures is thus very disturbing.

I think I've just spotted why you're taking me to task about this in such a heavy handed way. I'm not a highway engineer and I have zero dealings with anything to do with highways or transportation in my working life. I'm just interested in the subject and trying to understand the figures, which don't give me all the detail I wanted to know before forming a judgement. And again, for the second time, I'm not trying to rubbish the figures. I'm just trying to understand them.

[Jeni]

Near misses should be avoided full stop and if there are things HE can do better to prevent them we need to know they are taking action and not siting back accepting the status quo. It will be interesting to see the specifics of behind the BBCs worrying figures.

For as long as you have humans behind the wheel, you're going to have near misses.

[WHBM]

I would have thought that ANY responsible highways engineer would have shown concern about the figures the BBC unearthed

Some of us wonder whether "Responsible highways engineer" and "Smart motorway rollout" can be in the same paragraph.

[Debaser]

From this it seems that these recorded near misses are more to do with maintenance/construction personnel being nearly hit by passing road users, rather than road user/road user conflict. Which makes sense given the reporting structure in place.

Of course just because the near miss involves maintenance / construction personnel doesn't mean they are any less serious or acceptable than straight forward road user on road user incidents.

Whilst they are no less serious, even the HSE accepts workers can be exposed to a higher level of risk than road users.

[avtur]

.... Near misses should be avoided full stop and if there are things HE can do better to prevent them we need to know they are taking action and not siting back accepting the status quo. It will be interesting to see the specifics of behind the BBCs worrying figures....

Near misses can never be eliminated, in fact near misses will always happen and near-miss reporting is an essential tool in managing many activities in life. Analysis of data from near-miss reporting provides vital information that can be used in developing actions to manage activity and reduce re-occurrence. The aim being to reduce hazards and associated risk to 'acceptable' levels.

The increase in near misses, as reported in much of the media commenting on the BBC program, is quite alarming. I would be deeply suspicious of redefining 'near miss' criteria, to me that would suggest that either the definitions were wrong in the first place, which would question the competence of those who put them in place. Or, that it was a deliberate attempt to massage figure and deflect scrutiny.

It will be interesting to see what people's thoughts are after the program has been broadcast.

[Phil]

Near misses should be avoided full stop and if there are things HE can do better to prevent them we need to know they are taking action and not siting back accepting the status quo. It will be interesting to see the specifics of behind the BBCs worrying figures.

For as long as you have humans behind the wheel, you're going to have near misses.

Still doesn't make them acceptable. Next time they might not be a near miss - it could be a fatality.

As such, while its true that we are unlikely to ever completely prevent them from happening, we have a moral obligation to investigate each occurrence and adopt measures which seek to address diffidences wherever practical. cost, within reason, should not be a barrier.

[Jeni]

we have a moral obligation to investigate each occurrence and adopt measures which seek to address diffidences wherever practical. cost, within reason, should not be a barrier.

This is where taking someone's licence off them should be used.

[Bendo]

With apologies for the double post - can anyone find the actual FOI request and the response from HE? I understood that all FOI responses are published as a matter of course on gov.uk and whatdotheyknow.com, but I've searched both and can't find any request or response that contains any such figure. Perhaps I'm wrong and not all are posted online. We'd know it if we found it - it would also include data on failed electronic signage, which the report also quotes.

As the article doesn't state which length of M25 is in question, it's tricky to find corresponding data any other way, but it's presumably either J5-7 or J23-27 which are the ALR sections. Collision data for both is available online (5-7, 23-27 PDFs), which show a mixed bag of results - total collisions weren't wildly different before and after on either stretch; total KSI went up on one scheme and down on the other.

Only FOIs submitted via the whatdotheyknow.com website would be listed on there. That isn't an official website as such and it is likely the BBC would have submitted it directly to HE.

There is no central. Gov listing.

[Phil]

But I've no inside knowledge from Highways England so I don't know what stage they're at - only that it's not yet working as they want it to. If it was, they'd have a very quick fix to this PR storm by announcing that they've figured out how to detect stopped vehicles and they'll be doing it nationwide within X months at a cost of Y pounds. They haven't done that, I suspect because they can't.

The engineer in me says they can't because they (i) haven't started development early enough or (ii) they are not managing its development properly.

I'm sure the military probably have the ability to do what is necessary - and even my own field (rail) it doesn't seem that hard given we already employ radar obstacle detection at level crossings.

In the latter application you tell the software to ignore everything outside a specific area of the image so its only triggered by things being present on the crossing. In a roads based application it would similarly configured to only look at the traffic lanes - simply spotting an object by it being in the same place on the image for three scans. If you want you could get this to bring up an alarm and get an operator to verify it is something important rather than instantly triggering the signs.

Granted congestion would be an issue - but the risks of incidents that might result in sever injury or death are lower if traffic is stop start at 20mph. As such you might link the radar systems into speed monitoring devices and disable it if traffic speeds are less than 30mph say.

Incidentally one of the problems NR ran into was the radar they selected was the same as that being made for use in an American fighter jet programme. When the military programme ended so did the supply of radars as a small batch of 100 for NR use wasn't viable for the manufacturer. Possibility HE have run into similar problems with procurement - though I image they are looking at needing larger quantiles than NR

[Bryn666]

Near misses should be avoided full stop and if there are things HE can do better to prevent them we need to know they are taking action and not siting back accepting the status quo. It will be interesting to see the specifics of behind the BBCs worrying figures.

For as long as you have humans behind the wheel, you're going to have near misses.

Still doesn't make them acceptable. Next time they might not be a near miss - it could be a fatality.

As such, while its true that we are unlikely to ever completely prevent them from happening, we have a moral obligation to investigate each occurrence and adopt measures which seek to address diffidences wherever practical. cost, within reason, should not be a barrier.

It's quite simple; if we judge the risks posed by motorways to be too high then we just shut them. For the third time I will say if we applied railway operational practice to the roads they'd all be closed and never reopened due to the fact there are likely tens of thousands of near misses daily.

[Phil]

From this it seems that these recorded near misses are more to do with maintenance/construction personnel being nearly hit by passing road users, rather than road user/road user conflict. Which makes sense given the reporting structure in place.

Of course just because the near miss involves maintenance / construction personnel doesn't mean they are any less serious or acceptable than straight forward road user on road user incidents.

Whilst they are no less serious, even the HSE accepts workers can be exposed to a higher level of risk than road users.

However that does not mean companies can stand still and accept any given number of incidents as the norm. The HSE expect companies to be proactive - taking measures to address risks as they occur and taking note of any things which can be borrowed from other industries if they will prove helpful are all EXPECTED practices a failure to do so will result in prosecution under H&S law.

In other words if fitting ALR increases the risks to staff then their employer has a legal duty to put in place mitigation to try and bring the risk down. As such a increase from xx to xxxx near misses is not acceptable - even if we are talking about roads.

[Chris5156]

There is no central. Gov listing.

I linked to it in my post - you just need to filter for FOI requests and Highways England.

[Phil]

For as long as you have humans behind the wheel, you're going to have near misses.

Still doesn't make them acceptable. Next time they might not be a near miss - it could be a fatality.

As such, while its true that we are unlikely to ever completely prevent them from happening, we have a moral obligation to investigate each occurrence and adopt measures which seek to address diffidences wherever practical. cost, within reason, should not be a barrier.

It's quite simple; if we judge the risks posed by motorways to be too high then we just shut them. For the third time I will say if we applied railway operational practice to the roads they'd all be closed and never reopened due to the fact there are likely tens of thousands of near misses daily.

The rail industry does not 'shut down' as you put it when incidents occur - these days it learns from them. Near misses have gone down because people, technology and procedures have been improved following investigations - instead of traditional "well its a dangerous environment and people will dies" mentality.

After the Labroke grove crash did we shut down the rail network till TPWS was fitted? No of course we didn't - trains were up and running with no additional protection in and out of Paddington within a few days and other rail services continued as normal.

What DID change was an acceptance that the cavalier attitude towards SPADs* HAD to change! So very quickly we saw a whole raft of procedural changes happen while the development of the TPWS system was accelerated and fitted to the most high risk signals within 2 years**

What about the recent issues in Norfolk about trains not operating level crossings? Again temporary speed restrictions were put in place while permanent mitigation was developed.
Or what about the Mk1 rolling stock which was heavily criticised in the 1987 Clapham crash report yet continued in service unmodified until the mid 2000s.

All we are saying is that those in charge of the road network need to behave in a similar fashion. Stop repeating parrot fashion that "SMART motorways are safe" and start doing things to rectify the VERY REAL issues with them - like the appalling 17 minutes it takes to spot anyone stopped in a live lane. Similarly in any other industry having near misses go from XX to XXXX should have caused alarm bells to start ringing at the highest levels - why hasn't it at HE? Yes its expensive in people terms to deal with - but employing more staff to look at the monitors and getting rid of distractions to control room operatives are all easy things to do while technical developments as regards static vehicle detection are researched into a product that can be rolled out on ALR schemes just as TPWS was on rails.

Ultimately its a mindset issue - deaths and injuries on roads are no more morally acceptable that which occur in any other form of transport - or indeed society at large. Yes we are starting from a high base and the desire for personal motoring freedom makes things tricky to get reductions, but reductions can be made nevertheless. Any highway designer who thinks having near misses is a desirable state of affairs (as a principle that is) and cannot see the problem if large increases shouldn't be in that industry.



* Signal Passed At Danger

** TPWS is still NOT fitted to every signal! Although its use has expanded over the years its fitment has been guided on the basis of preventing 'worst case' incidents.